Corbyn, populism and power by Martell, Luke
 1 




Published in Hard Times, 101, 2018 
 
Jeremy Corbyn was elected leader of the Labour Party in 2015 with wide member support but 
opposed by most of the party’s parliamentary elite. In late 2016, his team, wary of a possible 
election and with the party lagging in the polls, decided on a populist approach, inspired by 
Trump’s no-nonsense anti-elitism. Corbyn was never one of the establishment, through his career 
a serial rebel against the party leadership and was seen as having an honest ‘unpolished 
authenticity’ (Bulman 2016, Stewart and Elgot 2016). He was allowed to be himself, perceived to 
be close enough to the people for this to find resonance with them. In the 2017 election campaign 
he spoke at large rallies and moved with ease amongst ordinary people, in contrast to the Tory 
leader who was said to be robotic in interviews and was kept away from the public. He used the 
slogans of ‘straight talking honest politics’ when standing for the party leadership, and ‘for the 
many not the few’ at the general election. The latter is from Labour pre-Corbyn, but has a populist 
content to it, for all of society, not just the core working class, and against the elite. Corbyn had a 
phase of using Trump-ist terminology about the system being ‘rigged’. For many he has seemed a 
man of the people, speaking directly to them, close to and for them, despite the opposition of 
political, media and corporate elites; a British part of a global populist surge in politics, left 
versions in Southern European parties like Syriza and Podemos, Sanders in the USA and the Latin 
American left. At the 2017 election, Corbyn’s Labour won an unexpectedly large vote, across 
classes, with strong support from the young. 
 
March (2017a, 2017b) argues, however, that there is little populism in mainstream British politics, 
beyond politicians being people-centric and claiming to be close to the people; as much 
electoralism as populism. Mainstream political populism, he says, is ‘fleeting, vague and tokenistic’ 
and not populist in the true sense of being anti-elitist and favouring popular sovereignty: ‘seeing 
Corbyn as populist is, at best, a half-truth’ (March 2017a). However, the glass is half full as well as 
half empty and there are populist dimensions to Corbyn’s policies, although some of it leftism 
creating populism as much as populism behind his leftism.  
 
There can be populism at several levels. Corbyn’s advisors were drawing on a perception that he is 
close to the people; a populism of the people. There is a politics of being popular with the people, 
with cross-class rather than sectional support, across divides and plural identities rather than 
based on a specific group. A simple and widely used definition is of being for the people against 
the elites. A stronger and narrower definition is as for popular sovereignty and popular 
democracy, a by the people populism. Economic populism is about being for the people against 
the elite in terms of material redistribution and egalitarianism. Populism is sometimes defined in 
terms of nationalism, against outsiders and exclusionary. Finally, there is populism by aim or 
achievement, intention or accident. Someone can achieve it without intending to.  
 
Populism in the party 
 
Ed Miliband resigned as Labour leader after the 2015 election. In the ensuing leadership contest 
Corbyn took his turn to be the candidate of the left. Everyone expected him to finish a distant 
fourth in a field of four. Leadership elections had changed, after Miliband, from an electoral 
college of unions, members and MPs to one member one vote, shifting power from MPs to the 
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grassroots. However, Labour leadership candidates required nominations from 15% of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and Corbyn only secured enough because non-supporters 
proposed him to ensure a broad field of candidates. He attracted great support from the rank and 
file desperate for an alternative to austerity and to the neoliberalism and austerity-lite of Labour 
since the 1990s. Corbyn’s personal appeal played a part. Many joined the party to vote for him. 
When he won, more signed up inspired by the direction he was taking the party. Corbyn achieved 
60% of the vote, the next candidate 19%. He came first across all categories of members, 
registered supporters and affiliated members. Most of the PLP opposed him and once he was 
elected many would not serve in his shadow cabinet. Labour had voted in a leader more left-wing 
than its PLP and closer to the membership than the parliamentary party. There were echoes of 
populism and anti-elitism; a leader going beyond elites and based in the people.  
 
Corbyn’s early days as leader were met with hostile opposition from the PLP and snide and 
mocking coverage by the media. Tory Prime Minister David Cameron derided his dress sense and 
perseverance in persisting as leader despite the onslaught he was under. But Corbyn, surrounded 
by solidaristic supporters and with the backing of the party membership, resisted pressure to 
resign. In 2016 a leadership challenge was made by Owen Smith. As incumbent, Corbyn no longer 
needed the minimum PLP nominations, which he would have failed to obtain this time. He won 
with 61% of the vote. Smith received a lower proportion of support than the three losing 
candidates combined in 2015. Corbyn had bypassed the media and PLP elites again and once more 
gained endorsement straight from party members. 
 
The party has grown phenomenally since Corbyn stood for and became leader, with 570,000 
members at the end of 2017, compared to 200,000 when he became leader, 405,000 at the peak 
under Blair, and 150,000 for the Conservative Party (Perry 2017, Waugh 2017). Corbyn brought 
many into the party: the young who had been alienated by anodyne Labour beforehand, excited 
by a genuine anti-austerity alternative; Old Labour supporters who had left the party or grown 
disillusioned and inactive; even Marxists and socialists who saw a radical leader and hope for the 
social democratic parliamentary road they had previously dismissed. 
 
Since Corbyn took the helm party reforms have increased the power of members, with more 
representatives on the National Executive Committee and a decrease in PLP nominations needed 
by contenders for the leadership, reducing the elite veto. A party review is investigating how to 
further expand members’ power in policy making. Proposals include more representation on party 
bodies, again reducing the role of the PLP in nominating leadership contestants, and the 
mandatory reselection, and so possible deselection, of parliamentary candidates. The review aims 
to challenge the boundaries between party and movement. What may have seemed utopian, and 
raising contradictions between party and movement, now looks, in the context of change in the 
party, plausible and coherent.  
 
So, in the party Corbyn is popular with the people, for them and on popular sovereignty grounds 
could be said to be populist. His place within Labour and proposed reforms fit, to an extent, with 
of-, with-, for- and by- populisms. But spreading democracy to party members favours the left so it 
may be politics leading to populism as much as populism being the driving force. And how populist 
Corbyn is, is affected by whether populism in the party becomes populism of it; whether popular 
support for the leader in the party translates into the same across society electorally, and party 
democratisation extends in government to popular democracy in society as a whole.  
 
Populism in support: of and with the people? 
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In 2017, Prime Minister May calculated she could increase her majority against a party with a left-
wing leader under siege and called an election. But Corbyn won much greater support than 
expected. Labour’s share of the vote rose from 30% in 2015 to 40%, compared to the Tories’ 42%, 
and Labour gained an additional 30 seats in parliament.  
 
Where did Corbyn’s support lie (see Curtis 2017)? His, and that for May, was cross-class, popular 
rather than class-based and sectional. He won especially significant support amongst the young 
and expanding ranks of the more highly educated. This dropped amongst the older and those 
without degrees who supported the Tories more strongly. This group will shrink as the educated 
young grow older and take their place. A key issue is whether the backing of the young educated 
for Corbynism is lifecycle, so they become more right-wing as they get older, or generational and a 
sign of a lasting left anti-austerity cohort, in which case the Corbynite proportion of the population 
will grow over time. Corbyn can mobilise the liberal-left educated middle class, especially the 
younger members of this strata and public-sector workers, although his acceptance of Brexit could 
risk alienating a mostly pro-Remain group. It is not clear if he has support from the insecure 
precariat, a cross-class group, but they seem likely to be open to his anti-austerity politics more 
than Labour’s prior submission to neoliberalism, and Labour was well ahead amongst the 
unemployed in the election. With the private sector aspirational working class and less educated 
middle class, materialistically oriented and sometimes self-employed, Corbyn may have a problem 
where Blairism has more appeal. The question is whether this is enough to lose Labour elections.  
 
Post-election surveys did not show strong support amongst Labour voters for Corbyn as ‘Prime 
Minister material’ but suggested belief in his policies (Barasi 2017). Bringing anti-austerity and 
redistributional politics back into mainstream political discourse has involved hegemonic 
leadership by Corbyn, finding points of contact between the material reality of people’s lives and 
his ideas and mobilising people behind them, something Thatcher was also skilled at.  
 
So, Corbyn can be seen as populist in being of and with a cross-section of the population, not 
predominantly a particular class. But while he did well in the general election and won broad 
support, some groups do not support him in large numbers and he did not win. The Tories were 
returned to office and also received wide backing, so Corbyn has no greater claim to popular 
support than them. Furthermore, is cross-class support, or seeking it, which all politicians want, 
populism or just electoralism? Being of the people, understanding their concerns, expressing them 
and winning their support, may not be populism, or just thin populism. Being for the people 
against the elites or democratic empowerment of the people, by-the-people politics, are more 
clearly in the category of populism. 
 
Populism in society: for and by the people? 
 
Corbyn attacks elites and argues for the people on economic grounds, criticising tax evasion and 
the top few’s riches. The 2017 manifesto proposes the highest 5% earners pay more income tax, 
everyone else to give no more. The middle classes are not targeted for extra income tax, 
beneficiaries of redistribution to be the broad mass not just the working class, giving a populist as 
much as a class basis to Labour’s egalitarian approach. Labour propose greater popular power in 
the economy: doubling the size of the co-operative sector, giving employees first right of refusal if 
their companies go up for sale, for local and community forms of non-profit public ownership in 
the energy and water sectors, and widening trade union representation in workplaces. The party 
proposes nationalisation of rail and the Royal Mail. A party report suggests further expansion of 
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municipal and local social ownership, and democratised national state ownership. In the public 
sector, Labour intend to expand local participation in NHS planning, reverse health service 
privatisation, and re-insource public services. They say they will increase community involvement 
in local government planning and fan participation in sports governance. Labour advocate a more 
representative make-up in decision making across policy areas, as well as within the party, and 
lowering of the voting age to 16. (Labour Party 2017a, 2017b). 
 
The party propose a constitutional convention on extending democracy nationally, regionally and 
locally. The policy forum developing their next manifesto takes submissions from any members of 
the public. It is consulting on devolving power to local communities, how to facilitate participation 
and democratic accountability in them, extending democratic ownership in the economy and 
accountability of educational institutions to parents, children and the community. Corbyn has 
argued for public involvement in local budget decisions, referenda on public service outsourcing, 
greater trade union bargaining rights, and staff representation on executive remuneration 
committees. He proposes more online democracy, citizens’ assemblies, and replacement of the 
House of Lords with elected representation; contrasting proposals for bottom-up democracy with 
monopolisation of power in the ‘closed circles’ of central government, the heights of the civil 
service and corporate boards (Smith 2016).  
 
Corbyn’s politics are of, for and with the people in economic egalitarian anti-elitism. There are by 
the people elements in the economic bases for participation that redistribution can facilitate. 
Economic egalitarian populism may have political power populism effects. Party policies involve 
shifting power to the public sector for and on behalf of the people away from private interests and 
economic elites. They propose a more democratic economy, greater direct popular participation in 
the workplace and public-sector planning, and devolution of power closer to the people in 
localities politically (see Guinan and O’Neill 2018). There are populisms of, for, and on behalf of 
the people against the elites and by the people in these policies.  
 
Nationalist and economic populism 
 
Populism has been defined as about nationalism and exclusionary. Corbyn is primarily focused on 
the UK and the interests of people in Britain. But the 2017 manifesto contains internationalism in 
the tradition of the Labour left (Labour Party 2017a: ch. 12). And Corbyn is not nationalist 
especially. He does not promote Britishness as an identity, and his politics are not ethnically 
exclusive like right-wing populism.  
 
Corbyn’s Labour say funds should be diverted to areas where public services are affected by 
immigration (Labour Party 2017a: 28-9), seemingly endorsing discourses that immigration causes 
social problems. However, while he has said that Brexit will end free movement he also states this 
does not pre-determine a Labour government limiting it (Kuenssberg 2017). One of Miliband’s 5 
election pledges in 2015 was ‘controls on immigration’. Corbyn’s manifesto, though, makes a clear 
rhetorical differentiation from anti-immigration sentiment. There is a strongly worded disavowal 
of scapegoating and blaming migrants for problems they did not cause and for valuing their 
contribution to the UK (Labour Party 2017a: 28-9). Corbyn argues, like Miliband, that problems 
ascribed to immigration, such as the undercutting of pay and conditions, are labour market issues, 
requiring employment protections rather than immigration controls.  
 
Corbyn accepts Brexit, exiting the single market and is against a second referendum on a 
completed Brexit deal. But Brexit was won in a referendum and his acceptance is for democratic 
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rather than nationalist reasons. His history of Euroscepticism is about opportunities for a left 
government outside a neoliberal EU, not xenophobia. In his departure from nationalism and 
racism there are clear differences between right-wing populism and Corbyn’s politics. He 
campaigned for Remain, although perhaps for political as much as conviction reasons, and has 
marked his position off from the Conservatives’ by advocating continuing British membership of 
the Customs Union. 
 
It can be argued that nationalist-populism is not populist as it divides ordinary people as much as 
unites them, whereas economic populism is about a unified popular mass against a small wealthy 
elite. It less divides the many amongst themselves, more the many against the few. Corbyn’s left-
populism is economic and about economic equality and redistribution, against rich elites, and for 
greater economic inclusion, justice and rights for most of the people. Left economic populism has 
a more socio-economic focus than the socio-cultural nationalist right concerned with identity and 
is more inclusive and pluralist than the cultural and exclusive nationalist-populism of the right. 
 
But left and right populism do not differ because the left one is socio-economic and right-wing 
populism is cultural. There is a neoliberal populism that is socio-economic and stresses 
individualism and property rights; taking power from the state and public sector and giving it to 
people through private ownership and market choice. The left departs from this by having a 
collectivist and redistributive concept of empowerment. For politicians like Corbyn, the state not 
the market, and government not capital, are for the people. So, Corbyn’s populism differs from the 
far right’s nationalism by its socio-economic and inclusive approach but also from neoliberal right 
populism by different conceptions of socio-economic justice and rights for the people and the 
means to these.  
 
The horseshoe model that sees left and right as curving close in their radical reaches does not 
work here. The economic egalitarianism and social democracy of Corbyn is far away from the 
ethno-nationalism of the radical right and the economics of neoliberal populism. Economic 
egalitarianism creates the populism in his politics. It is ideology that makes his populism; not 
populism that makes his politics.  
 
Left, right, populism and power 
 
Corbyn is a democratic socialist but his policies are social democratic, for political as much as 
ideological reasons, for egalitarian and socialist institutions within capitalism. Labour’s policies for 
rail nationalisation do not require the expropriation of private property, just non-renewal of 
contracts for companies running train services. 60% of the population support rail nationalisation 
and state train operations are common in countries like Germany and France where rail travel is 
superior. A majority support nationalisation in areas like water, the Royal Mail and energy (Smith 
2017). A proposed National Investment Bank has featured in past Labour policies and other 
countries. Quantitative easing for the people echoes Keynesianism, once accepted across the 
political spectrum. Abolishing £9000 student fees sounds radical. But 20 years ago there was free 
university education throughout the UK as there is in countries like Scotland, Germany and 
Denmark.  
 
But Corbyn is radical measured against neo-liberal austerity-lite Labour of the ‘90s onwards and 
after 30 years of neoliberalism as the paradigm for politics in the UK. And alongside for- and on-
behalf-of the people policies that shift power from private interests to the public sector, are 
potentially radical by-the-people proposals for a mass movement-based rather than elite-led 
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Labour Party, and greater economic democracy and popular participation in the running of public 
services. At the same time, it is leftism and egalitarianism that make this populism as much as 
populism constructing Corbyn’s ideology. Categories of left and right tell us as much about Corbyn 
as those of elitism and populism.  
 
Britain has been under the political and ideological spell of neoliberalism since 1979. Political 
discourse shifted to the right such that market principles became a norm for public policy 
decisions, as well as for the private sector, and the burden of proof came to lie with those who 
want to use collective provision and planning rather than private sector delivery and the market. 
This was a path set by Thatcher but further established by Blair, who ruled out alternatives in his 
politics of political caution and the market. Labour vacated alternative ground. There have been 
no mainstream political forces across the UK to oppose this and take another way. Advocating 
alternatives has been left with social movements, pressure groups, Green and small left and 
parties and academics. But rather than trying to compete with the Tories on their own grounds, 
Corbyn has brought collective provision, economic equality, and social democracy back into 
mainstream politics. He has reintroduced as normal the role of the state for the people, and 
concerns for the people less focused on individual achievement and more on collective effort and 
the poor. Instead of accepting dominant discourses of austerity, Corbyn has mobilised support for 
an alternative to austerity and moved it from marginal to mainstream.  
 
Corbyn’s leadership has been endorsed by party members against Labour’s parliamentary elite 
and won cross-class support in the 2017 general election. His policies match with egalitarianism 
rather than individualism in the electorate. It remains to be seen whether this of-, with- and for-
the-people populism will extend to an electoral majority. If it does Corbyn’s programme will 
challenge political, media and corporate elites of the UK. He proposes economic egalitarianism 
alongside the beginnings of a populist reconstruction of power towards the people within and 
beyond his party. There will be a fightback by those with power and Corbyn may need to appeal to 
the people in and beyond the party and to extra-parliamentary forces in his defence. In the face of 
elite attacks, his economic populism may rely on an expansion of his political populism that gives 
power to the people. 
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